Interpreting focus again by Geurts, B. & Sandt, R.A. van der
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/59974
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
Interpreting focus again
BART GEURTS & ROB VAN DER SANDT
How to respond to such a ﬁne collection of commentaries which are,
without exception, thorough, to the point, constructive, and full of sug-
gestions for improvement? The best response by far would be a radical
overhaul of the target article – but that is against the rules. The next-best
thing would be a page-by-page discussion of each commentary separately
– which the editor wouldn’t allow. So we have no choice but to make a
selection of the many good points that have been raised, and hope against
hope that we will manage not to distort them too much.
The plan for the following discussion mirrors that of ‘Interpreting
focus’ (IF). So we start with the main issue, concerning the association
between focus and presupposition, then turn to focus particles, and con-
clude with a few remarks on it-clefts.
Promiscuous bindees
One of the central tenets of IF was formulated as follows:
The main prediction that the BPR gives rise to [ . . . ] is that focusing should cause
the projection behaviour that is characteristic of deﬁnite noun phrases, factive
verbs, and the like.
Most of the commentators express reservations about this claim, and
several present data intended to refute it, such as the following:
(1) a. (My team didn’t score a goal.) Did the othersF score a goal?
(Bu¨ring)
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b. (Did anybody eat the beans?) Yes, FredF ate the beans.
(Kratzer)
Intuitively, the backgrounded material in these examples serves to link
up to information in the preceding discourse that would be inaccessible
to ordinary presuppositions. Hence our claim that focusing causes pro-
jection behaviour must be false. As Kratzer puts it, ‘[t]he inferences con-
tributed by backgrounding just don’t seem to behave like run-of-the-mill
presuppositions. They project and compose di¤erently.’
This objection is based on the premiss that we are out to defend what
Bu¨ring calls the ‘Uniformity Hypothesis’:
Uniformity Hypothesis
The accessibility requirements for antecedents for the focus supposition P equal
those for the antecedent of Ordinary Presuppositions as introduced by the, too,
regret, stop, also, it-clefts etc. etc.
There is an unfortunate misunderstanding here, which must be due to our
wording of the claim that focusing causes projection behaviour. As illus-
trated by Bu¨ring’s Uniformity Hypothesis, our claim has been taken to
entail that all presuppositions project in the same way, but as we argue at
various points in IF (though not, alas, in the vicinity of the passage cited
above), that is not the case. To be sure, the principles governing presup-
position projection are always the same. But individual presuppositions
vary along two dimensions at least. First, due to di¤erences in form or
content, some presuppositions are easier to accommodate than others.
Secondly, some presuppositions bind to inaccessible positions and give
rise to fully transparent construals, while others don’t.
Hence, a better way of expressing our empirical claim is as follows:
Given that there is a range of variation in the projection behaviour of pre-
suppositions, the behaviour displayed by backgrounded material falls within that
range.
If this is correct, as we maintain it is, the proposed explanation is that the
projection mechanism underlying presupposition is operative in the inter-
pretation of backgrounded information, as well.
Both Ja¨ger and Schwarzschild point out that the proper treatment of
examples like (1a–c) follows naturally from our analysis of ‘too’. We ar-
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gued that the presuppositions associated with additive focus particles
(‘too’, ‘also’, ‘even’, ‘again’) have a somewhat special structure which
allows them to bind in positions that are formally inaccessible from the
positions in which they arise. Schwarzschild observes that this is a char-
acteristic of focus presuppositions in general (cf. also Schwarzschild
1999). Ja¨ger illustrates the point with respect to the contrastive phrases in
(2).
(2) Maybe JohnF yelled, and maybe BillF yelled.
In both (1a–c) and (2) the focus presuppositions may, within the frame-
work of our theory, be bound to a formally inaccessible antecedent since
the resulting DRS is non-defective.1 So, taking into account Ja¨ger’s and
Schwarzschild’s observation, our theory turns out to actually explain why
it is that in cases like (1a–c) and (2) focus presuppositions may be bound
in positions that are inaccessible to most other presuppositions.
The inferences licensed by the BPR are, in Schwarzschild’s happy
phrase, ‘promiscuous bindees’. This partly accounts for Kratzer’s intu-
ition that focus presuppositions are ‘expressive meanings’. Focus pre-
suppositions ﬁt Kratzer’s description of expressive meanings in that they
don’t care very much about the accessibility restrictions that most other
presuppositions have to obey. According to Kratzer, however, ‘a charac-
teristic property of expressive meanings is that, once computed, they
cannot participate in any further processes of meaning composition,’ and
in our view this is not a characteristic of focus presuppositions. In con-
junction with our theory of presupposition projection, the BPR predicts
that focus presuppositions are promiscuous bindees that will a¤ect truth-
conditional content in certain cases (e.g. by restricting the domain of a
quantiﬁer).
The status of the BPR
In our formulation of the BPR we went out of our way not to say that
focusing ‘triggers’ presuppositions, explaining in a footnote (n. 10) that
1 There are cases in which a focus presupposition contains discourse referents that become
free when the presupposition is bound in an inaccessible position, but such cases are the
exception rather than the rule (see below).
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we prefer to avoid this locution because we are not convinced that the
relation between focus and presupposition is in all respects the same as
that between grammatical (i.e. lexical or syntactic) presupposition triggers
and their presuppositions, for which these terms are commonly used. Our
admittedly informal characterisation of the connection between back-
grounds and presuppositions was that since focusing serves to evoke set
of alternatives, it is plausible to assume that there is a general presump-
tion to the e¤ect that, in any given case, one of these alternatives holds.
This only the beginning of an explanation, of course, and it is one of the
parts of our theory that needs more work.
Jacobs’s commentary may be seen as addressing this issue (though this
is not how he views it; see below). Jacobs discusses the relation between
the BPR and a discourse rule he dubs the BDR:
The Background-Discourse Rule (BDR)
If an utterance us of a sentence s has a free [focus background structure] that gives
rise to a background lx[j(x)], then us is felicitous only if lx[j(x)] has already been
under discussion in the relevant stretch of discourse preceding us.
The BDR accounts for the well-known observation that the focus posi-
tion in an answer correlates with the wh-phrase in the backgrounded
question, and may be used to derive the default of existential inference for
focal backgrounds from a rather uncontroversial assumption, namely that
a question presupposes that at least one of its possible answers is true.
This assumption is an essential feature in the theories of Hintikka (1976)
and Belnap and Steel (1976), and is adopted, implicitly or explicitly, in
much subsequent theorising on questions.
The assumption that questions have existential import predicts (for
free focus-background structures) that existential import comes about
in an indirect way: the existential presupposition we observe derives from
the backgrounded question. However, as Jacobs points out, this view is
problematic for the simple reason sequences like the following are fully
acceptable:
(3) Has anybody invited Gerda? PeterF invited Gerda.
Here the existential import of focusing cannot be attributed to the pre-
ceding question, evidently. It was observations like this that led us to re-
main non-committal as to the origin of focus presuppositions.
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Incidentally, we disagree with Jacobs’s view on sentences in (4):
(4) a. If PeterF invited Gerda to the party, she will certainly come
b. If my information is correct, then PeterF invited Gerda to the
party.
Jacobs observes that these sentences may be felicitously uttered in the
context of (5), and takes this to imply that they don’t come with existen-
tial presuppositions.
(5) Do you know whether Gerda was invited to the party?
In our opinion, (4a–b) do have existential import. This inference may
seem to be ‘suspended’ in the context of (5), but that is due to the fact
that the focus presuppositions link up to the embedded question.
We concede that, as it stands, the BPR is stipulative and will have to be
motivated somehow, perhaps by recourse to general discourse principles
such as BDR. However, Jacobs goes on to suggest that such principles
are bound supplant the BPR, and in this respect our views di¤er. The
crucial observation is that the inferences triggered by focusing appear to
exhibit projection behaviour. Jacobs acknowledges that they do, and
gives a ‘rough sketch’ as to how this behaviour can be accounted for, but
it must be said that his sketch are very rough indeed. We don’t want to
exclude the possibility that Jacobs’s programme may be carried through,
but in default of a more detailed explanation, a theory of focus interpre-
tation will have to fall back on a mechanism of presupposition projection,
or else signiﬁcant regularities will remain unaccounted for.
Beyond copy and paste
In IF we implemented the BPR as a copy-and-paste procedure without
paying proper attention to technical details, and it is only fair that Ja¨ger
and Schwarzschild should take us to task for this. Having been forced to
look harder we now see that the issue is hairier than we assumed when we
wrote our paper, and we are not out of the wood yet. But we are inclined
to take Ja¨ger’s advice, which we interpret as follows. The way we for-
mulated it, the BPR associates with each background lx:j(x) a presup-
position to the e¤ect that lx:j(x) holds of some entity of the appropriate
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type. We have realised in the meantime that implementing this idea be-
comes a lot easier if we use l-terms in the DRS-language, as well, so that
is what we will do. That is, we now represent backgrounded material by
a l-abstract that takes focused material as an argument. Here is an
example:2
(6) Beryl always drinks sherryF.
(7) [x: Beryl(x), [e: ]hEei[: ly[: x drinkse y](sherry)]]
Ja¨ger recommends that all and only discourse referents that are in-
troduced within a background should be relabeled when a copy is made.
Having l-terms available, we can implement this by simply making a
verbatim copy of the l-term, and applying it to a fresh discourse referent.
For the example in (6), this yields the DRS in (8a):
(8) a. [x: Beryl(x),
[e: ]hEei[z: ly[: x drinkse y](z), ly[: x drinkse y](sherry)]]
b. [x: Beryl(x),
[e; z: ly[: x drinkse y](z)]hEei[ly[: x drinkse y](sherry)]]
The underlined presupposition in (8a) cannot be bound, nor can it be
accommodated in the main DRS, because that would cause a free occur-
rence of the event variable e. Therefore the presupposition is accom-
modated in the restrictor of the adverbial quantiﬁer.
If we adopt this procedure, any discourse referents within a back-
ground that are introduced outside of it are not reintroduced. In the ex-
ample above, u and e are not reintroduced, the former because it is part
of a presupposition triggered by the name ‘Beryl’ which goes to the main
DRS, the latter because it is bound by the adverbial quantiﬁer. This is to
say that any presupposition-inducing expressions within a background
(including pronouns) must be processed before the BPR applies.
Only
According to the interpretation given in (8b), (6) says that whenever Beryl
drinks something, she drinks sherry. It does not exclude the possibility
2 (6) occurs in IF as example (26), and the following analysis is the same as that given in
IF; l-terms are merely a convenient tool for making the procedure more transparent.
154 Bart Geurts & Rob van der Sandt
Brought to you by | Radboud University Nijmegen (Radboud University Nijmegen)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 7/11/12 12:04 PM
that whenever Beryl drinks something, she drinks sherry and something
else (milk, say). Schwarzschild seems to think this may be a problem,3 but
it isn’t. Beaver and Clark (2003) observe that a sentence like (6) doesn’t
entail that Beryl drinks nothing but sherry, as witness the fact that the
following is consistent (cf. also the commentaries by Beaver and Kratzer):
(9) Beryl always drinks sherryF, though she sometimes drinks milk as
well.
Beaver and Clark point out that ‘always’ and ‘only’ are strikingly di¤er-
ent in this regard, as the contrast between (9) and (10) illustrates:
(10) *Beryl only drinks sherryF, though she sometimes drinks milk as
well.
How can this contrast be accounted for? The answer, we believe, lies
in the rather obvious fact that ‘always’ binds the event variable associated
with the verb, while ‘only’ does no such thing. To illustrate, we suggest
that the initial DRS for (11) is something along the lines of (12a):
(11) Beryl only drinks sherryF.
(12) a. [x: Beryl(x), :[y: lz[e: x drinkse z](y), y0 sherry]]
b. [x: Beryl(x), y 0: lz[e: x drinkse z](y 0),
:[y: lz[e: x drinkse z](y), y0 sherry]]
In the initial DRS for the example with ‘always’ in (8a), the event vari-
able in the background is bound from outside, by the adverbial quantiﬁer.
In (12a), by contrast, the event variable is introduced within the back-
ground, so the BPR yields a presupposition of the form [y 0: lz[e: x drinkse
z](y 0)]. The presupposition ends up being accommodated in the main
DRS, yielding (12b). Unlike its counterpart in (8b), this DRS entails that
Beryl drinks sherry and nothing but sherry. Hence the di¤erence between
‘always’ and ‘only’ is explained simply by assuming the obvious, viz. that
the lexical meaning of ‘always’ involves event-like entities, while that of
‘only’ does not. The resulting analysis is rather less contrived than Beaver
and Clark’s.
3 More precisely, Schwarzschild suggests that if there is a requantiﬁcation problem (which
he doubts, apparently), (6) would be an instance. (Schwarzschild’s example (13) has ‘a
martini’ instead of ‘sherry’ but the point remains the same.)
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In our discussion of ‘only’ we argued at some length that ‘only’ is not
a strong quantiﬁer, presupposing that it makes sense to ask if ‘only’ is
strong or weak. Beaver and Eckardt raise doubts about this presupposi-
tion. Eckardt considers the discussion ‘not very helpful’; Beaver (forth-
right as ever) calls it a ‘bogus issue’. We still believe there is a real issue
here, so let us try to get it into the open. According to Horn (1996), ‘only’
is a reversed universal quantiﬁer (Beaver and Clark follow Horn in this
respect). Putting it more bluntly than Horn would ever do, ‘Only A is B’
means the same as ‘Every B is A’. Now it so happens that ‘Only A is B’
and ‘Every B is A’ are alike in that they have existential import: both
sentences imply that B is non-vacuous. This is not an accident, in Horn’s
view: ‘Only A is B’ has existential import, he claims, because ‘only’ is a
universal quantiﬁer.
In IF we elaborated on Horn’s analysis in two ways, both of which
seemed entirely natural to us. First, having argued that ‘Only A is B’
presupposes that B is non-empty, and accepting the widely held opinion
that ‘Every B is A’, too, presupposes that B is non-empty, we read Horn’s
‘has existential import’ as ‘triggers an existence presupposition’. Secondly,
since the existence presupposition of ‘every’ and its kin correlates with the
fact that they are strong quantiﬁers, the question we raised was: Is it true
that the existential presupposition associated with ‘only’ is due the fact
that it is a strong quantiﬁer? Our answer to this question was, and still is,
no: ‘only’ is weak and its presupposition is due to the BPR.
We hope that the foregoing remarks will at least convince our critics
that our way of framing the issue makes sense. Whether our attempts at
resolving it cut any ice is a di¤erent matter altogether.
Too
Eckardt uses the following example to argue that our analysis of ‘too’ is
insu‰ciently constrained:
(13) ?There is Fred, and BarneyF is staying at the Ritz, too.
Eckardt observes that (13) is infelicitous and that our theory fails to
explain why it should be. And she is right on both counts. According to
our analysis, ‘too’ triggers a double-barreled presupposition: ﬁrst there
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is an anaphoric presupposition which requires that some individual x,
x0Fred, be contextually given, and then there is a more substantive
presupposition saying that x is staying at the Ritz. The ﬁrst presupposi-
tion may be linked to Fred, and the second one may be accommodated
(assuming, of course, that no further contextual information is available).
We agree that (13) is infelicitous and that our theory of ‘too’ doesn’t
explain why. But, we submit, it is not all obvious that a theory of ‘too’
should explain why (13) is infelicitous. (13) is incoherent, it is true, but so
is the following:
(14) ?There is Fred, and his dog eats olives.
Furthermore, (13) improves a great a deal if we insert a speaker’s turn in
the middle:
(15) A: There is Fred.
B: O, that reminds me: did you know that BarneyF is staying at
the Ritz, too?
As our account leads us to expect, B’s utterance suggests rather strongly
that Fred is staying at the Ritz, as well.
Whatever it is that makes (13) awkward, we are not convinced that the
contribution of ‘too’ is an essential part of the explanation. However, the
conclusion which Eckardt seeks to establish is correct: our theory of ‘too’
is incomplete. This is shown by observations made by Bu¨ring, Kratzer,
and Schwarzschild:
(16) ?Fred is not staying at the Ritz and BarneyF is staying there too.
(Schwarzschild)
(17) Sue doubts that Ed attended the meeting, but we all agree that Jill
attended the meeting (?too). (Kratzer)
(18) (Sue thinks Bob married Christie.) Does Steve think Bob (?also)
married NanaF? (Bu¨ring)
The examples by Schwarzschild and Kratzer suggest that the presupposi-
tion associated with ‘too’ cannot bind to an antecedent in a non-veridical
environment (Giannakidou 1998). Bu¨ring’s example may be taken to
show, as he himself suggests, that additive focus particles like ‘also’ and
‘too’ imply (by way of conventional implicature, perhaps) that it is at
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least possible for the matrix sentence and the antecedent proposition to be
true together: with ‘also’ (18) is odd, it seems, because Bob cannot be
married to two women at the same time. (He can in a polygamous soci-
ety, but there the sentence wouldn’t be odd.)
The foregoing observations do not refute our analysis of ‘too’. For the
time being, they merely show that it is incomplete. On reﬂection, this is
not so remarkable. As argued by Kripke (ms) and Asher and Lascarides
(1998), it is rather plausible that ‘too’ requires a relation of parallelism
between two propositions, and the constraints imposed on this relation by
our analysis are very weak indeed. It remains to be seen, however, if and
how our constraints can be strengthened to yield a better theory.
It-clefts
Gawron, Ja¨ger, and Schwarzschild discuss Rooth’s (1999) argument
against an existential semantics for focus (i.e. the BPR), which uses ex-
amples like the following:
(19) A: Did anyone win the football pool this week?
B: ?Probably not, because it’s unlikely that it’s MaryF who won
it, and she’s the only person who ever wins.
B 0: Probably not, because it’s unlikely that MaryF won it, and
she’s the only person who ever wins.
In order to explain why (19B) is awkward, Rooth assumes that the exis-
tential presupposition triggered by the it-cleft projects to the main DRS
(the terminology is ours, not Rooth’s). So the speaker presupposes that
someone won the football pool, thus contradicting his own statement that
he doesn’t know if someone won the football pool, and therefore the
sentence is odd. Now if the backgrounded material in (19B 0) triggered a
presupposition, the sentence should be infelicitous, too. But in fact it is
ﬁne, so there can’t be an existential presupposition in (19B 0).
Rooth’s argument depends on the assumption that if we adopt the
BPR, sentences like (19B) and (19B 0) will the same in all relevant re-
spects; in particular, they will have the same presuppositions. In IF we
sought to undermine this assumption by arguing that it-clefts di¤er from
plain focus-background sentences because they contain anaphoric pro-
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nouns (i.e. descriptively attenuate presupposition inducers). Put other-
wise: clefts are di¤erent because, contrary to what is often assumed, the
pronouns they contain are not expletives. If this much can be shown,
Rooth’s argument collapses.
In an attempt to show that cleft pronouns are anaphoric, we pointed
out that they alternate with demonstratives:
(20) {It/This/That} was Fred we just saw.
Gawron objects against this argument, noting that in English ‘this’ and
‘that’ cannot always substitute for cleft pronouns:
(21) {It/*This/*That} was from Fred that he borrowed the racket.
Gawron concludes from this observation that ‘there seems to be at least
one [cleft] construction that does require an expletive ‘it’ ’ – at least one
construction, that is, for which Rooth’s argument goes through.
In our opinion, Gawron’s conclusion is not warranted by his obser-
vation. This is not to say that we are convinced that our view on cleft
pronouns is correct. It is merely to say that, as things stand, there is no
conclusive evidence for either position, because there are too many un-
certainties regarding the grammar of it-clefts. Gawron suggests that the
grammar of the ‘this’ and ‘that’ variants of (20) may be di¤erent from
that of the ‘it’ variant, but we consider this a moot point. Gawron also
suggests that the structure of (21) may be special, which would be in line
with Dik’s (1980) diagnosis, but as far as we know there is no consensus
on this matter, either. Nor is there consensus on the question how clefts
relate to copula sentences, for example. If so much is unclear, the issue is
bound to remain moot for the time being. But it is safe to say, we believe,
that there is reasonable doubt about the expletive hypothesis, hence room
for exploring alternatives – which is all we need for our purposes.
Returning to the minimal pair in (19), and supposing that cleft
pronouns are anaphoric, how can we account for the di¤erence in ac-
ceptability between B’s cleft sentence and the non-cleft uttered by B 0?
According to Gawron and Ja¨ger, our position is that there is local ac-
commodation in the ﬁrst case and accommodation failure in the second,
the di¤erence being due to the fact that it-cleft presuppositions are gen-
erally harder to accommodate. There are problems with this approach, as
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Gawron and Ja¨ger show, if only because intuitively the focus of B’s an-
swer should be linked to A’s question.
Our hypothesis is that, for the reasons given above, cleft pre-
suppositions are di‰cult to accommodate. But this in itself does not yield
a full explanation of the contrast between clefts and non-clefts. The pic-
ture is rounded out by Schwarzschild’s observation that, on our account,
focus presuppositions are promiscuous bindees, whilst cleft presupposi-
tions are not. To explain this, let us look at a simple example ﬁrst:4
(22) a. It was FredF who sneezed.
b. [x: Fred(x), z: sneezed(z), z ¼ x]
(23) a. FredF sneezed.
b. [x: Fred(x), ly[: sneezed(y)](x), z: ly[: sneezed(y)](z)]
The double underlining of z in (22b) is motivated by our hypothesis that
the cleft pronoun is anaphoric. The crucial di¤erence between (22b) and
(23b) is this. The presuppositional material in (22b) cannot be bound be-
cause the resulting DRS will contain a free occurrence of z. The presup-
position in (23b), by contrast, could be bound to a formally inaccessible
antecedent without causing the DRS to be defective. In brief, while focus
presuppositions are promiscuous bindees, cleft presuppositions are like the
presuppositions triggered by deﬁnite descriptions, for example, in that they
introduce discourse referents which reappear in the non-presuppositional
matrix.
The complete story of the contrast in (19) goes as follows. Being a
promiscuous bindee, the focus presupposition in B 0 can be bound either
within the context of A’s question or, as Schwarzschild suggests, within
the propositional content conveyed by ‘probably not’. Either way, the
presupposition is bound in a formally inaccessible position, which is not
an option for the cleft presupposition in B. The latter can only be in-
terpreted by way of accommodation, which is problematic because it
contains a presupposition that is descriptively attenuate. Whence the
contrast in acceptability between the two sentences.
4 In (22b), the contribution of the BPR is not shown, because it is obviated by the cleft
presupposition.
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